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MULTI-EVENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT USING NON-COOPERATIVE REPEATED 
GAMES 
Upavan Gupta 
ABSTRACT 
 
The optimal allocation of the resources to the emergency locations in the event of 
multiple crises in an urban environment is an intricate problem, especially when the available 
resources are limited. In such a scenario, it is important to allocate emergency response units in a 
fair manner based on the criticality of the crisis events and their requests. In this research, a crisis 
management tool is developed which incorporates a resource allocation algorithm.  The problem 
is formulated as a game theoretic framework in which the crisis events are modeled as the 
players, the emergency response centers as the resource locations with emergency units to be 
scheduled and the possible allocations as strategies. The pay-off is modeled as a function of the 
criticality of the event and the anticipated response times.  The game is played assuming a 
specific region within a certain locality of the crisis event to derive an optimal allocation. If a 
solution is not feasible, the perimeter of the locality in consideration is increased and the game is 
repeated until convergence. Experimental results are presented to illustrate the efficacy of the 
proposed methodology and metrics are derived to quantify the fairness of the solution. A 
regression analysis has been performed to identify the statistical significance of the results.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Crisis Management is the most intriguing issue of the twenty-first century. Sensing a 
crisis event, which could encompass a wide spectrum of conditions, ranging from but not limited 
to a road accident, fire, plane crash, natural disaster like hurricane and tornado, willful act of 
destruction, economical crisis, terrorist attack, nuclear emergency and security breach of any kind 
and responding to it in order to mitigate its effects is considered as crisis management. An 
efficient crisis management system is of paramount importance, because if not responded to 
promptly and managed properly, even a small mishap could lead to a very big catastrophe with 
significantly severe consequences.   
 
1.1 Crisis Management 
Being equipped with a profusion of resources does not ensure a successful recovery from 
a crisis situation. The key to the successful recovery necessitates an effective and expedited 
allocation of the requested resources to the emergency locations. Each crisis situation requires 
some minimum number of units of certain types of resource to be allocated to it. The type and the 
number of resource units to be allocated depend upon the criticality, severity and the nature of 
incident. Additionally, depending upon the location of incident, a crisis event may request extra 
units of some resource types which could potentially be required, so that an already existing crisis 
situation does not spawn another crisis condition. For example, in a hypothetical scenario, a crisis 
situation due to a road accident involving collision between two cars, essentially requiring only a 
few police cars, a few ambulances, and a towing truck, may request for some additional police
 2 
cars in order to manage and redirect the traffic because failure in doing so would result in 
increased traffic congestion and could potentially give rise to another crisis situation.  
Crisis management is not restricted to sense and response. It comprises of a complete life 
cycle of activities which are carried out starting from definition of the crisis conditions, to actual 
identification of such conditions in a scenario, followed by recovery from them by allocation and 
scheduling of required resources to the emergency locations in an optimal manner and most 
importantly, learning from those situations, setting up new standards and laying down plans for a 
better recovery and mitigation in future [1,2]. Before understanding the crisis management life 
cycle, we need to know about two types of crisis conditions that could exist in a system.  
 
1.1.1 Types of Crisis Situations 
At any point of time, in a particular area, there may exist one of the following two 
conditions.  
1.1.1.1 Single Crisis 
If only one crisis event has occurred in a particular locality (lets assume a county), and it 
requires some resources to alleviate the situation, then such an event is easier to handle because 
all the requirements of the crisis can be satisfied from the resources available in that locality or 
can be made available from nearby locations. All the expendable resources available in the area 
are exclusively reserved for the crisis and will be allocated as requested. Hence, there will be no 
competition for the allocation of resources to that crisis situation. 
1.1.1.2 Multiple Crises 
When more than one crisis event occurs in a locality, all the crisis events will need 
resources of different types in different quantities, to be allocated to them in order to recover from 
those situations. In addition to some distinct types of resources, some resources of same type may 
be required by a few of those crises. Since there is a limited supply of those resources in the 
locality, such a situation would lead to a competition among the different crises events, where 
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each of those events would try to acquire the required resource units, at a minimum cost. The cost 
in the scenario would be a function of a number of factors including the criticality of the crisis 
situation, the distance between the crisis location and the resource center, the average allowable 
speed on the route between crisis and resource, and the parameters related to the time of the 
occurrence of the event. These attributes contribute towards the cost in terms of total response 
time for getting a resource, which a crisis tries to minimize. The optimal allocation of resources to 
the crises in a multiple crises scenario where crises are competing for receiving the required 
number of resource units from limited supply is a challenging and more intricate issue.   
 
1.2 Crisis Management Life Cycle 
The important elements of the complete life cycle of a crisis [1] are shown in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Crisis Management Life Cycle [1] 
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As soon as a crisis condition surfaces, a series of actions are required in order to manage 
that crisis.  
 
1.2.1 Response    
A swift and appropriate response to an event is possible only if a condition is sensed as a 
potential crisis. In order to diagnose such a condition, the crisis management system should have 
relevant information to detect if a critical threshold has been reached, leading to an emergency 
[3,4]. Response involves the allocation and mobilization of the required resource units and 
emergency equipment to the crisis locations.  In a multi-event crisis situation, an optimal 
allocation of those units is of paramount importance.  
 
1.2.2 Recovery 
 After a prompt response to the emergency, an apposite recovery is essential. Recovery 
includes discarding the wreckage, taking care of the people and the commodities affected by the 
crisis, resurrection of the infrastructure and a lot many activities to assuage the effects of crisis. 
Loan and grants may be required for the recovery purposes and if the crisis is big, federal 
assistance could be required.  
 
1.2.3 Mitigation and Risk Analysis 
Mitigation is a very critical step in the emergency response life cycle. Though it appears 
in the third phase of the crisis life cycle, it essentially is a continuous process with intent of 
improving people’s life. This is done by improving the infrastructure and taking better 
precautions. This reduces the impact of disasters, including natural disasters like hurricanes and 
floods, on lives of people and communities.     
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Risk analysis and reduction is essentially the goal of mitigation process. Better and 
successful mitigation from emergencies is possible if the risk analysis for those emergencies is 
apt. This in turn leads to more effective risk reduction.  
 
1.2.4 Information Update  
Whenever a crisis event occurs, it uncovers a lot of issues that were not addressed earlier 
and hence led to the crisis. Such an event also provides a lot of information for dealing with such 
conditions in future. Type and number of resource units required, maximum acceptable response 
time, and potential crisis events associated with the emergency are a few examples of the 
information we can get from the crises. All this information needs to be updated in the system’s 
database. This information would be useful for the future endeavors of dealing with similar 
situations.  
 
1.2.5 Preparedness 
Preparedness ensures that if the same type of disaster strikes in future, people and 
response agencies are better prepared for it and the loss due to disaster is minimized. A better 
preparedness ensures a swift and effective recovery from the disaster. A good risk analysis, 
updated information and proper mitigation process attributes towards a better preparedness and 
hence a successful recovery. These attributes tries to prevent the crises from occurring in future, 
and if it can not be prevented, tries to subdue its effects at minimum cost.  
 
1.3 Multi-Event Crisis Management 
As mentioned earlier, a multi-event crisis scenario consists of simultaneous occurrence of 
more than one crisis event. Managing multiple crisis events is an intricate problem, because of the 
existence of competition among the crises for allocation of resources that are available in a very 
limited quantity. In such a situation, the allocation of resources to the crises should such that it 
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satisfies the requirements of all the crisis events within an acceptable time frame. The problem 
could be better explained with the aid of an example scenario described in Figure 1.2.  
At some instance of time, in a particular locality, the following crisis events have 
occurred. 
• At the airport situated on south west of a county, a small size cargo air-plane has crashed. 
While landing, the pilot lost the control over the plane and it ended up hitting the trees 
near the runway. There were two people in plane, a pilot and a co-pilot.  
• Around the same time, somewhere in the northern part of the county, a house caught fire 
because of some leakage in the gas pipe. No one was at home when the fire started. 
• During the same time frame, at the intersection of Fowler Ave. and Bruce B. Downs, 
which are localities in Tampa, a car coming from the wrong direction collided with a 
small truck, thereby causing some major injuries to the drivers and passengers.  
• A football game was happening at the Raymond James stadium between a local and a 
visiting team at the same time. During the game, some of the decisions taken by the 
referee got into controversy and the local team supporters got agitated, which very soon 
resulted in a fight between supporters of the two teams. 
Now, each of these crisis events needs some resources to be allocated to them in order to 
recover from those conditions. Let us assume that the plane crash would need around 3 police 
cars, two fire engines and a couple of ambulances, while the house fire would just require a police 
car for supervision and 4 to 5 fire engines. The road accident would require around 5 to 6 police 
cars to look over the accident and re-route and manage the traffic. Also, it needs at least 3 
ambulances to quickly send the injured people to hospital and a toeing truck to move the vehicles 
and clear the traffic. The fight at the stadium would require 7 to 8 police cars and a few 
ambulances to handle the situation. Additionally, each of the crisis events has a priority 
associated with it, which depends upon the criticality of the event. In the present scenario, the
 7 
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most critical incidence is the road accident followed by the plane crash. The fire in building and 
the fight could be kept at the same priority level, less critical than the crash. 
The availability of the resources is shown in Figure 1.2. There are three police stations 
(blue building with a star on it), two hospitals (H), one towing agency (next to one of the police 
stations) and one fire department (FD) in the locality. Since only one incident (road accident) 
needs the assistance of towing agency, there will be no competition for that particular type of 
resource. Among the other resource types, police cars are required at all the crisis event locations, 
ambulances are required for handling the road accident, the fight and the plane crash and fire 
engines for the house fire and the plane crash. Now, as we see here, there is a limited supply of 
these resources in the locality and almost all the crises events require some units of each of these 
resources for recuperating from crisis condition. Such a situation demands a sense and response 
system, which could facilitate an optimal allocation of resources to the emergencies.  
In a distributed environment, the system would monitor all the events and if a critical 
condition arises, it would respond to it in a proactive manner [3,4,5]. The system would ensure 
that the following issues are addressed in the most optimal way. 
• Each crisis location receives the requested service (resources) at an optimal cost 
• The total cost for servicing the crises in the system (environment) is optimal 
 
1.4 Optimization 
A mechanism of allocation of resources satisfying the requirements of each crisis in such 
a way that the overall cost of allocation of resources for the complete scenario is optimal, would 
be considered as an optimal allocation. In such an allocation, the total cost of allocation of 
resources for the complete system would be optimal and would satisfy the requirements of 
individual crisis events in the best possible manner [30,31].  
Optimization protocols or mechanisms can be evaluated on the basis of different criteria 
including knowledge, computational complexity, quality of solution [6], individual rationality, 
 9 
stability, pareto efficiency and distribution and communication efficiency [7]. Different 
optimization algorithms address these issues with different priorities. A few optimization 
algorithms include simulated annealing [8,9,10,11], tabu search [12,13,14], hill climbing method 
[6,15], genetic algorithm [10,14,16,17,18,19], greedy search [20], Bayesian optimization[21], and 
random walk. All optimization algorithms generate results which are optimal for some of the 
criteria listed above, while providing non optimal results for other criteria. Some of these 
optimization algorithms are unusable for some specific cases, like the one in which a player has 
incomplete information about other players. A detailed comparative study of various optimization 
algorithms has been carried out in the following chapter. 
For the multi-event crisis management scenario, the crisis events require a methodology 
of allocation of resources that is optimal on almost all the criteria listed above, but is specifically 
optimal in terms of quality of solution and rationality.   
 
1.5 Motivation for this Thesis Work  
Multi-Event crisis management is an issue of supreme importance which needs to be 
addressed and dealt with in the best possible manner. Many agencies like FEMA [1,2] and 
projects like Infospheres [3,4,5] are dealing with this issue of sensing the crises and responding to 
them. Most of the work has been carried out in the direction of identifying the crises conditions, 
prioritizing them according the criticality, identifying the types of emergency response units each 
type of crisis condition would require, alerting the response units when a system enters a critical 
condition, preparing the emergency managers for such emergency and disaster conditions and 
responding to the emergency conditions by positioning the response units to crises location. After 
recovering from the emergency situations, the next important task is to learn from those 
emergencies and update the criticality parameters accordingly. Laying down some new ground 
rules for preventing such conditions in future or to reduce the risk of loss in such situations have 
also been addressed by these projects. Despite all this, none of the projects deal with the issue of 
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providing a definitive method for allocation and scheduling of the response units to the crises 
locations so that they receive those resources in an optimal time. 
The work being carried out by these projects would be more effective if the emergency 
locations in a multi-crisis scenario, receive the resource units in a prompt manner. This is the 
motivation to develop an automated computer based solution for allocating the resources to the 
crises in a multi-crisis scenario. A solution system which could take the resource requirements of 
crises as input and could implement a resource allocation optimization algorithm on those inputs 
to come up with a proposed allocation of resources to each crisis as an output, would be really 
helpful for the agencies like FEMA in realizing their goals.  
In a multi-crisis scenario, where each crisis location requires a few units of different 
types of resources to be allocated to it and the availability of resources is very limited, there is a 
competition among the crises, for the allocation of resources. In order to allocate the resources to 
the crises location in an optimal manner, the system inputs the resource requests by the crises and 
using a resource allocation optimization algorithm, outputs an allocation which could satisfy each 
crisis location’s request in an optimal manner.  
In the proposed application, the scenario is modeled as a normal form non-cooperative 
game [23,24,25] where the crises events are considered as players of the game, the emergency 
response locations are considered as the resource locations and the cost of getting the units from a 
resource location is modeled as a function of different attributes including distance between 
source and destination, average allowable speed on the route between them, the time at which 
crisis occurred and the criticality of the crisis event. Each Crisis location, based on the cost and 
the requirements, has an associated payoff for getting the resource units from a resource location. 
Each crisis location has a set of strategies, which essentially is a set of different combinations of 
the resource locations from where it could receive the required units. These strategy sets are given 
as an input to the game, which employs an optimization algorithm and outputs a strategy 
combination, one strategy for each player, satisfying the requirements of players in an optimum 
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manner. Nash Equilibrium algorithm [24,26,27,47] is used as the optimization algorithm for 
allocation.  
According to the Nash Equilibrium allocation, each player receives the best possible 
utility, taking into consideration that the other players adhere to the allocation made to them. 
Nash Equilibrium solution is considered to be the most socially optimal solution which ensures a 
rational behavior of players. The algorithm generates a good quality optimal solution. Though the 
computational complexity of the algorithm is high [29], we have applied some heuristics in order 
to speed up the convergence to the equilibrium solution.   
  
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
The rest of the document is organized in five chapters. In chapter 2, we will briefly 
discuss about the prior work being done in the field of crisis management and optimization 
algorithms. We will review some of specific issues being addressed in the projects referring crisis 
management. Also, we will describe some of the optimization algorithms which are prominently 
used in the field of resource allocation and scheduling, and will qualify the aptness of using game 
theory for our system. The chapter will also give a short introduction of Game theory, including 
the various classifications of games. Chapter 3 will describe the actual formulation of the game, 
including the problem statement, the various notations used and the objective function. A 
hypothetical scenario will also be explained as an example.  
The actual algorithm of the game and Nash Equilibrium solution methodology will be 
discussed in chapter 4. In chapter 5, we will present the experimental results which will be 
generated by running the algorithm on different sets of inputs, using different values for the 
various parameters. The chapter will have the comparative study and results generated by our 
algorithm in comparison with some other implementations of the problem. We will also talk 
about the computational complexity and space complexity of the game and will be compared 
against those of other algorithms. Finally, in chapter 6 we will talk about the conclusions drawn 
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from implementing the system and the results, and will give an overview of the future work we 
intend to pursue in this field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
Homeland security being the most compelling concern of every country, demands for a 
comprehensive and efficient system to manage and recover from any kind of emergency situation 
[49]. The events encompass every possible adversity ranging from an illegal network intrusion to 
a major terrorist attack.  A significant amount of research work has been performed as a part of 
academic as well as federal and corporate projects to address the subject of multi-event crisis 
management and resource scheduling.  
In this chapter, some of key projects that have been implemented in the field of crisis 
management and resource allocation will be reviewed and the different domains of crisis 
management being addressed by these projects will be addressed. Then, the various resource 
allocation methodologies available in literature will be studied. Each of these methodologies 
achieves an optimal solution, and possesses some special characteristics which differentiate it 
from other algorithms. Next, a concise introduction to Game Theory and the different 
classifications of games will be presented. The chapter will conclude with a qualification for the 
choice of implementing game theory and Nash Equilibrium algorithm as the resource allocation 
mechanism for current research. This will be accomplished by performing a comparative study 
between the different methodologies including Nash Equilibrium algorithm, on the basis of 
different parameters. 
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2.1 Multi-Event Crisis Management Projects 
 The field of crisis management incorporates a wide range of events and different projects 
explore different domains of it. In this section, some projects which specifically concentrate on 
emergency management and disaster recovery will be addressed. The discussion will include the 
prominent issues which these projects address. 
 
2.1.1 FEMA 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the largest unified crisis 
management organization [1]. It is an integral part of United States of America’s Department of 
Homeland Security’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate.  The headquarters of 
FEMA is situated in Washington D.C. Along with 2,600 full time employees it has nearly 4,000 
standby disaster assistance employees who are available for deployment after disasters. FEMA 
works in partnership with other federal, state and local emergency management agencies to 
accomplish its goals of efficient crisis management. 
FEMA covers a broad spectrum of activities that includes advising people about the 
disasters and teaching them get through such conditions, helping equip state and local agencies in 
emergency preparedness, and responding to the disasters like hurricanes, floods, volcanic 
eruptions, fires, nuclear emergencies and terrorist attacks. Mitigating the effects of disasters on 
people, learning from the disasters and working towards a better preparedness for handling them 
in future are some of the most important tasks performed by FEMA. Effectively, FEMA performs 
a series of activities during every stage of the life cycle of a crisis. The life cycle has been 
described in figure 1.1 and a detailed strategic plan of FEMA for the fiscal years 2003-2008 is 
described in [2].  
 FEMA’s perspective of emergency management does not incorporate the actual physical 
allocation of the resources to the emergency locations. These activities are administered by the 
local and state agencies, which manually allocate the required resources to the crisis locations. 
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The agencies do not use any automated tool that could provide a solution suggesting an optimal 
allocation of resources to all of the crisis locations.  
 
2.1.2 Infospheres 
A research group at the Department of Computer Science at California Institute of 
Technology has conducted a project called Infospheres [3], which concentrates on the 
development of compositional systems. Compositional systems are the systems built from 
interacting components. The project is concerned with the theory and the implementation of 
compositional systems that support peer-to-peer communication among persistent multithreaded 
distributed objects. The system finds one of its applications in the field of crisis management.  
Infospheres system holds a repository of data from multiple sources and normalizes it to a 
standard vocabulary, proactively monitors all the components in a distributed system and 
determines if some critical condition emerges. When such a condition holds, the system responds 
to it by generating an alert to all the concerned response objects which will be required to manage 
that crisis [4,5]. The system is essentially a distributed networked alert system.  
Confined as an alert system, Infospheres does not perform any actual allocation of those 
response units to the crisis locations. But, the system could prove to be a perfect infrastructure for 
the crisis management system being proposed by us since the system is equipped with all the 
sensors and network monitoring paraphernalia that are key requisites for our system. 
 
2.1.3 British Columbia Emergency Response Management System  
BCERMS is an emergency response program being developed by the province of British 
Columbia, Canada [6]. This is a comprehensive emergency management and disaster relief 
system, which covers almost all the aspects of emergency management. The project defines the 
objectives of the system, identifies the crises, analyses the requirements of each type of crisis 
 16 
event, allocates the required resources to the crisis locations according to the requests, addresses 
the rehabilitation issues, performs a good risk analysis and documents the experiences.  
The system incorporates all the important issues of crisis management and performs each 
of them efficiently.  But, it allocates the resources to multiple crises events manually, which does 
not result in an optimal allocation of resources. An automated emergency response system which 
could allocate the resources in an optimal manner would be the logical solution to this problem.  
 
2.1.4 Other Relevant Projects 
A few more emergency management projects have been implemented at different places. 
Some of the projects are MEMA (Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency), IEMA 
(Illinois Emergency Management Agency), GEMA (Georgia Emergency Management Agency) 
and Police Department Emergency Response Management Plan at University of California at San 
Francisco. All of these projects explore more or less the same domain of crisis management as 
FEMA and address similar issues. None of these projects refer to the actual allocation of the 
resources to crises. 
 
2.2 Crisis Management Tools 
  A multi-event crisis management system requires an efficient and capable toolset for 
successful recovery and mitigation from emergencies. With latest advances in the field of 
telecommunications and information systems, crisis management personnel can monitor the 
proceedings of a locality in real time. All the crisis management projects that have been discussed 
in the previous section use one or more of these tools. Some of the most appropriate tools have 
been briefly described here.  
• Sensors and Actuators: Different types of sensors including the sensors to find speed of 
vehicles, sense the existence of vital signs at an emergency location and sensing fire in a 
building are available. These sensors are of primary utility for the emergency 
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management systems.  The sensors generate event streams when any critical parameter 
changes are sensed.  These event streams are consumed by the actuators which try to 
either tone down the conditions which caused those critical changes or send an alert to 
the relevant response locations [4,5].  
• Geographical Information System (GIS): GIS is an organized collection of computer 
hardware and software designed to efficiently create, manipulate, analyze and display all 
types of geographically or spatially referenced data. This system allows complex spatial 
operations that are very difficult to do otherwise. A GIS system can be specifically 
developed for the purpose of crisis management by encoding the potential crisis 
locations, storing all the data related to those locations for the purpose of analysis and 
outputting the required service if the crises occur [50,51]. 
A GIS receiving data and information from sensors and actuators can act as 
foundation for the emergency management system.  
• Mobile Devices: A lot of mobile devices are also required for realizing the emergency 
management system; Global Positioning System (GPS) [53], Automated Vehicle 
Tracking System, Cellular Phone, Networked alert System, Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA),  and Intelligent Personal Assistant (iPA) to name a few [52]. These devices are 
required at the emergency locations for sending relevant data regarding resource 
requirements to the GIS system [53]. 
• Communication Network: An emergency management system can achieve its goals only 
if a good network system is available for communication. Sensor and Ad-hoc networks 
are the most appropriate networking technologies for an emergency management system. 
These are self reconfigurable networks which adapt themselves to the scenario and to the 
number of available system resources. Protocols have been developed for the mobile 
devices to establish connections to these networks.  
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2.3 Resource Allocation Algorithms 
 Resources allocation is an optimization problem with the objective of minimizing the cost 
of allocation while satisfying the constraints being posed by the system. Several algorithmic 
approaches have been proposed in the literature to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. 
Although most of these algorithms achieve globally optimal solution, it’s the unique properties 
exhibited by each algorithm that differentiates it from others and makes it more feasible for 
certain set of applications. This section discusses some of the widely used algorithms to solve the 
resource allocation problem.   
 
2.3.1 Genetic Algorithms 
Genetic algorithms are a class of evolutionary algorithms for resource allocation and 
scheduling that works on the principles of genetics. A genetic algorithm uses the techniques of 
recombination, mutation, inheritance and natural selection to evaluate an optimal solution. This is 
a non-deterministic algorithm which works on the law of survival of the fittest [11, 12, 15,16]. 
In genetic algorithms, the problem domain is formulated as the population of 
chromosomes, where each chromosome is a string of bits representing one of the possible 
solutions of the problem. Each chromosome has a “fitness” value associated with it. This fitness 
function is the objective function. The chromosomes follow the evolutionary steps of 
recombination, mutation and inheritance for many generations, giving rise to a new set of 
chromosomes at each generation, to come up with a promising, optimal solution. The fitness of a 
chromosome determines its ability to survive and reproduce. During this process, the unfit 
chromosomes are deleted from the population and are replaced by the more fit chromosomes 
[19,20].  
 The non-deterministic nature of genetic algorithms is attributed to the fact that it is not 
possible to predict the number of recombination that would be required before it converges to a 
solution. Hence, the algorithm searches the complete solution space in an undirected manner. If 
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the chromosomes only recombine and inherit at each generation, they may lead to a solution 
which is locally optimal. The process of mutation ensures that algorithm searches the entire 
solution space and generates a globally optimal solution [21,22,23].  A pictorial representation of 
local versus global optimization is shown in Figure 2.1. Genetic algorithms are very useful for the 
cases when we have very limited or almost no knowledge of the solution space.  
 In a genetic algorithm the search space never shrinks, which makes it non-deterministic 
and hence infeasible for a lot of scenario where an optimal result is expected within a time limit. 
This property makes the methodology computationally expensive. Also, since the algorithm 
works on principles of natural selection, it is very susceptible to some of the dominant members 
of population, which have survived for multiple generations and has a high fitness.   
 
2.3.2 Hill Climbing Algorithm 
Hill climbing algorithms are a class of algorithms based on the concept of local search. 
These algorithms tend to move towards a solution point which has a lower cost than the previous 
solution point, which generates a local optimal solution rather than a global one [18,23]. This 
would be a suboptimal solution. By accepting some inferior solution points the algorithm could 
be modified and directed towards globally optimal solution. Some of the algorithms which 
implement these modifications are simulated annealing and tabu search and are discussed in this 
subsection. 
 
2.3.2.1 Simulated Annealing 
 Simulated annealing is an optimization technique which simulates the actual process of 
annealing. Annealing is a process of cooling solids in a heat bath. When a solid is heated past the 
melting point and then cooled down, the structural properties of the solid depend upon the rate of 
cooling. If the liquid is cooled at a slow rate, perfect crystals will form. However, if cooled 
quickly, the crystals will be imperfect. The algorithm simulates this process, by starting from a 
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valid solution point and randomly generating new states, and calculating the associated cost 
functions [9,10]. 
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  Figure 2.1 Global vs. Local Minima and Simulated Annealing 
 
If the cost of the new state is lower than the cost of the previous state, i.e. if 
∆ (current_cost– previous_cost) ≤ 0, it is accepted and the algorithm moves to the newer state. 
This process would lead the system towards optimum solution, but this solution could easily be a 
local minima. In order to overcome this problem, the algorithm, with a certain probability, accept 
a state whose cost is more than the previous state. The probability depends upon the temperature 
of the system. If the temperature is high, the probability of accepting a higher cost state is high 
and as the temperature goes down, the probability of acceptance of higher cost stages decrease. 
An explanatory picture of simulated annealing process is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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 One of the major drawbacks of simulated annealing is the computation time of the 
algorithm [11,24]. The algorithm’s computational complexity is NP complete, because it is a 
search technique. Also, the algorithm does not generate a solution that is socially optimal. The 
algorithm is non-deterministic in nature. 
 
2.3.2.2 Tabu Search 
 Tabu search represents a set of algorithms which have descended from the local 
improvement techniques. Technically, the basic algorithm is of deterministic nature, but the 
variations of the algorithm which are used in most of the implementations, are classified as 
stochastic because of their properties and behavior.  
 A tabu search algorithm randomly explores the complete solution space on the basis of 
local searches with controlled up-hill moves. A tabu list is maintained to prevent the algorithm 
from choosing the same solution sequence and falling into a locally optimal space. Starting from 
an initial point, the algorithm searches the approximate optimum of the solution space by moving 
from the current solution to the next solution in the neighborhood of the current solution. The 
solution points listed in the tabu list are not considered as the candidates of the next solution. The 
next solution in the search space is represented as  
 
N(sk(x)) = Min (N(s(x))): s∈S(x-T)        (2.1) 
where; 
x – Current Solution 
s(x) – Candidate of next solution  
T – Set of solution points in tabu list 
N(x) – Objective function 
s(x) – Set of neighborhood of x 
sk(x) – Selected kth move 
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If sk(x) is selected as the kth move, then the inverse move sk-1 is memorized as the tabu 
move in the tabu list. A solution point remains in the tabu list only for a limited number of 
iterations, after which it is removed from the list and could be selected as probable outcomes in 
future. This algorithm does not guarantee an optimal solution, but provides a near-optimal 
solution in worst case scenario [7,13,14].   
 Although tabu search is a very pragmatic and successful algorithm since it searches the 
solution space for a globally optimal solution, it still has some drawbacks which make it 
undesirable for some applications. Practically, the algorithm is non-deterministic and it requires 
some additional space to store the tabu list [16]. Also, it is an arduous job to choose the search 
space for the algorithm and decide the effective neighborhood structure. 
 
2.3.3 Bayesian Optimization 
Bayesian algorithms are based on the assumption that an unknown function could be 
modeled heuristically as a sample function of a Gaussian random process. The function satisfies 
the following properties: 
• The expected value of the unknown function f(x) conditioned on all the 
measurements taken, is a piecewise linear approximation of f(x) itself. 
• The conditional variance of the approximation is quadratic between observation 
points. 
At each iteration of the algorithm, the next solution point is chosen to be a point in the 
search domain which maximizes the probability that the existing function exceeds the largest 
value by some positive constant conditioned upon all past evaluations of the function [26].  
Prob[ f(x) ≥  fnmax + ε n  | X1,X2, . . ., Xn ]       (2.2) 
where, 
f(X) – Unknown function 
Xn – Selected solution point at nth stage 
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fnmax – Solution with maximum value 
ε n – Positive constant 
Bayesian optimization methods find the globally optimal solution by minimizing the 
number of evaluations of the function, because it searches for each solution point in the solution 
space only once. This optimality comes at the expense of increased computational time. The 
search space for the algorithm is bounded and thus the results are deterministic. This ensures that 
the algorithm generates same results for different runs on same solution space. The high 
computational complexity makes the algorithm impractical for the problems with more than 8-10 
design variables. 
 
2.3.4 Random Walk 
Random walk is a simple process of visiting the solution points of a solution space, in a 
random order. The algorithm starts from a fixed solution point, and at each step, moves to one of 
the neighboring solutions randomly chosen according to a predefined distribution [27]. The 
algorithm keeps selecting different solution points till it reaches an optimal solution.  
The algorithm is very simple to implement as it does not involve any type of complex 
calculations to select the next neighbor. No additional memory is required to keep track of the 
previous solution points. But, one of the important concerns for the methodology is to how to 
decide that the random walk has reached a satisfactory solution node? Also, since there is no 
recordkeeping of the previous stages, the algorithm does not learn and hence has no intelligent. 
This makes it impossible to identify the direction of search in the search space and determine the 
time it will take to converge to an optimal point. 
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2.3.5 Greedy Search 
The algorithms which work on the concept of choosing the best possible outcome at each 
stage without taking into consideration the effects of those choices in future are classified as 
greedy algorithms [29,47]. These algorithms are easy to implement because at each step the 
decision is made on the basis of very limited information available at that stage and the 
information is not carried forward for use in the stages followed.  
Convergence to an optimal or sub-optimal solution is very fast when a greedy algorithm 
is used. But, greedy algorithms get stuck in local minima and hence the results generated by them 
are not globally optimal. 
 
2.4 Game Theory 
Game theory, developed by John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 [30], is 
a collection of mathematical models formulated to study the situations of conflicts and 
cooperation. More precisely, it’s a general theory of rational behavior for situations in which 
rational decision makers  (players) have available with them a finite number of courses of action, 
each leading to a well defined outcome or end with gains and losses expressed in terms of 
numerical payoffs associated with each combination of courses of action for each decision maker 
[34]. Game theory studies the phenomenon of negotiation between rational agents in conflict 
situations, in a very general setting. Game theory does not cover the games of changes where the 
decision makers do not have any influence on the results [32,35].  
 
2.4.1 Elements of Game 
The essential elements of a game are [32,36,48]: 
• Players: Players are the individuals who make decisions. The decision maker’s goal 
is to maximize its utility by choice of strategies.  
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• Action: An action or a move by a player is the choice it can make. 
• Strategy: A player’s strategy is the rule that tells him which action to choose, on the 
basis of the information available with the player. 
• Strategy Combination: A set of one strategy for each player in the game. 
• Strategy Space: A set of all the possible strategies of all the players in the game. 
• Payoff: Payoff is the utility or expected utility a player receives as a function of the 
strategies chosen by him and all other players.  
• Information: A player’s information set is his knowledge at a particular time, of the 
values of different parameters. 
• Equilibrium: It is the strategy combination consisting of the best strategy for each 
player in the game. The equilibrium is represented as 1.1: 
S* = {S1*, S2*, S3*,…, Sn*}         (2.3) 
        where 
S* - Equilibrium strategy set 
n - Total number of players 
       Si * - Best strategy for player i 
• Objective: Objective is the goal of game, i.e. whether we wish to maximize the 
payoff for each player or to minimize it. 
 
2.4.2 Classification of Games  
The games could be classified on the basis of different parameters of classification 
[33,37,38,47,48]. Some of the major classification criteria are discussed here. 
2.4.2.1 Cooperation 
• Cooperative Games: The games in which either players can make commitments to 
coordinate their strategies or some external factors could enforce coordination are 
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called cooperative games and the solution to a cooperative game is a cooperative 
solution.  
• Non-Cooperative Games: The games in which neither players, nor any external 
agency could enforce the coordination are called non-cooperative games. In these 
games, the cooperation is not enforced externally but is self-enforcing. In a non-
cooperative game, all the possibilities of commitment are incorporated in the rules of 
game and the solution of game reflects that.  
2.4.2.2 Number of Players 
• Two-player Game: The games with just two players competing for resources. 
• Multi-player Game: In games with more than two players, the complexity of game is 
much higher than a two player Game. 
2.4.2.3 Time Dependence 
• Static or Simultaneous Move Game: In such a game all the players make the moves 
simultaneously, without the knowledge of the strategies chosen by other players in 
the game.  
• Dynamic or Repeated Game: The game in which the players interact by playing the 
game multiple times. By playing the same game multiple times, each player has some 
information about the strategies of other players and thus the strategy chosen by the 
player is contingent on the strategies being chosen by other players during past 
moves.     
2.4.2.4 Degree of Opposing Interest 
• Constant-sum Game: In these games, the sum of payoffs for all the players is a 
constant for any outcome. Here, the gain of one player is always at the expense of the 
loss to other player. A zero-sum game is a special case of constant-sum game in 
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which the sum of payoff for all the players is zero and is obtained by normalizing the 
payoffs. Sporting events are a good example of such games.  
• Variable-sum Game: Here, the sum of the payoffs to all the players is not a constant 
value. This means that the gain to one player may not be a loss to another player i.e. 
the players have some strategies of common interest which could lead to an outcome 
where all the players are better off by cooperation. These are also known as Non 
Zero-sum games  
2.4.2.5 Number of Moves 
• Finite Game: In a finite game, there are some fixed set of rules and boundaries and    
the game is played within those set of boundaries in order to win and end the game. 
Here, the same game is played a finite number of times and the equilibrium generally 
remains constant.  
• Infinite Game: The game has no fixed rules and boundaries and is played for infinite 
iterations and the equilibrium point in such games changes over the course of time 
and tries to learn from the previous results.  
2.4.2.6 Types of Strategies 
• Pure Strategy Game: In a pure strategy game, the players have pure strategies. A 
pure strategy for a player is a complete plan of play for him for its information set.  
• Mixed Strategy Game: In such a game, there is a probability (>=0) associated with a 
player’s each set of actions. The sum of the probabilities for the complete set of 
strategies is 1.   
2.4.2.7 Amount of Information 
• Complete Information Game: In games of complete information, the player has all 
the information about other players’ strategies before it makes a move. He knows at 
least as much as those who have moved before him. These games are further 
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categorized in two types; Perfect Information, where the player knows about all the 
possible moves of other players and outcomes of the game, and Imperfect 
Information, where the player know all the possible outcomes of the game but not the 
moves of other players. 
• Incomplete Information Game: Here the player who has to make a move does not 
know everything that has happened so far. Most of the simultaneous moves games 
are imperfect information games. 
2.4.2.8 Type of Mathematical Formulation 
• Normal Form Game: A normal form game is a game with a finite set of players, each 
having a finite set of strategies and utilities associated with them, make simultaneous 
moves and receive some payoff.  
 = (Si, ui); i∈Ι          (2.4) 
where, 
I – Set of players from i = 1, 2,…, n 
Si – Strategy set of player i 
ui – Utility function of player i 
ui = in Si ℜ          (2.5) 
• Extensive Form Game: An extensive form game can be represented as a tree, whose 
each node represents a choice made by a player. In such a game the players make 
their choice in a sequential order. It gives a detailed description of all the possible 
moves, outcomes and information for the game.  
• Characteristic Function Form Game: This type of game provides the possible 
outcomes for a set of players forming a coalition and working in cooperation. 
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2.5 Nash Equilibrium Algorithm 
In a game theoretic setting, the solution of the game should reflect rational behavior of 
players. Nash Equilibrium optimization algorithm is one such solution. Nash Equilibrium for a 
game is a combination of strategies, one for each player, such that for a player i, if the strategy 
combination of all other players remains the same, player i would do worse by not playing the 
Nash Equilibrium strategy [31].  
 Mathematically, for a Normal form game represented in (2.4), the strategy combination 
{s1*∈ S1, s2*∈ S2, …, si*∈ Si, …, sn*∈ Sn} is a Nash Equilibrium, if for all i, 
  ui{s1*, s2*, …, si*, …, sn*}   ui{s1*, s2*, …, si, …, sn*}        (2.6) 
where, 
ui – Utility for player i 
si* –  Nash Equilibrium strategy for player i 
Si – Strategy set for player i 
 If the strategy sets Si for all the players are convex, then there always exists at least one 
Nash Equilibrium. More than one Nash Equilibrium can exist for a game, but there is no way to 
select if one is better than other.  
Nash Equilibrium algorithm finds a globally optimal allocation of resources to the 
players. The solution is a good quality solution, which means that the allocation made to each 
player is the in the best interest of the players and the complete game as well. But, evaluating the 
Nash Equilibrium solution is an NP complete problem [44] and hence the convergence of the 
algorithm is non deterministic. Also, it is not necessary that a Nash Equilibrium solution is pareto 
optimal and visa versa.   
 Numerous methodologies have been proposed for finding the Nash Equilibrium solution 
for the games and some of those have been discussed in [39,40,41,42,43]. 
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2.6 Why Nash Equilibrium? 
For the multi-event crisis management scenario, we propose to define the resource 
allocation problem as a game and generate the optimal allocation using Nash Equilibrium 
algorithm. The decision of adopting Nash Equilibrium algorithm against the other candidate 
algorithms that we have discussed in section 2.3 is based on the analysis of the comparative study 
of these algorithms (Table 2.1) based on the various parameters relevant to the problem of multi-
event crisis management under consideration [7,16,17].   
 
   Table 2.1 Comparative Study of Algorithms 
 
 As evident from the comparative study, the algorithms which perform better on most of 
the parameters are genetic algorithms, hill climbing algorithms, Bayesian method and Nash 
Equilibria. Among these algorithms, genetic algorithms can not be chosen for our scenario, 
because they do not provide individual rationality since some of the members of population 
Parameter →  
Algorithm ↓  
Knowledge Optimal Quality of 
Solution 
Complexity 
Space       Time 
Individual 
Rationality 
Stability 
Genetic 
Algorithm 
limited or 
none 
Global Satis. High High Satisfactory Satis. 
Tabu    
Search 
Prior Info. 
Required 
Global Average High High Non 
determin. 
Satis. 
Simulated 
Annealing 
limited or 
none 
Global Satis. Medium High Non 
determin. 
Satis. 
Bayesian 
Method 
Prior Info. 
Required 
Global Average high High Non 
determin. 
Satis. 
Random 
Walk 
limited or 
none 
Local Non Satis. Low Non 
determ. 
Non 
Satisfactory 
Non Satis. 
Greedy 
Search 
limited or 
none 
Local Non Satis. Low Low Non 
Satisfactory 
Non Satis. 
Nash 
Equilibria 
Information 
Required 
Global Satis. High High Satisfactory Satis. 
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becomes dominant as the algorithm progresses. In case of multi-event crisis management, each 
crisis event is very important and the decision maker needs to make rational decision for it. There 
are different priority levels for crisis events, but each of them is required to be serviced in the 
optimum and rational manner.  
 Hill climbing algorithms (tabu search and simulated annealing) do not provide a good 
quality solution and the individual rationality for these algorithms is non deterministic. So these 
algorithms are not acceptable for our scenario where the quality of solution is of primary 
importance.  
Bayesian algorithms have high space and time complexities which can not be controlled. 
Also, they provide an average quality of solution and the individual rationality of player is non 
deterministic, which is unacceptable in the scenario of multi-event crisis management.  
Nash Equilibrium algorithm exhibits unique property of social optimality [45] that is very 
important in the case of Multi-event crisis management and has not been addressed by any other 
algorithm. In such a situation, the individual fairness for each player is optimum and the average 
fairness of the system is high. Hence, the Nash Equilibrium solution provides a better quality of 
solution where the individual rationality of players is very good. 
The property of social optimality or social utility ensures that each player of the game 
receives the best utility for himself and for the complete system. In this setting, the optimization 
of individual utility ultimately leads to a system wide optimization. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FORMULATION OF A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME 
 
In a crisis scenario with multiple emergencies existing at some instance of time, the 
allocation of requested response units to the emergency locations is a challenging problem. We 
propose a game theoretic solution for the emergency response problem which uses Nash 
Equilibrium algorithm for the optimal allocation of the requested resources to the appropriate 
crises. In this chapter, first the problem of multi-event resource allocation will be formally 
defined and realized in a game theoretic setup. Then, the notations that would be used in this and 
the following chapters will be specified and explained. The chapter will conclude with the 
definition of objective function for the game.  
 
3.1 Formulation of Game 
A hypothetical example of a multiple crisis environment is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The 
same example scenario will be studied in a more comprehensive manner in this and the following 
chapters and a multi player, non-cooperative, non zero-sum normal form game for resource 
allocation will be formulated. 
Figure 3.1 shows a minor variant of the previously described scenario. This variation will 
be used in addressing some more intricate issues that could arise in a multi-crisis scenario. As 
shown in Figure 3.1, at some moment of time T0 four crisis events have occurred; an air-plane 
crash, a fire in a building, a road accident and fight at a stadium. The locality in which these 
crises have occurred is “AREA A”. In AREA A, there exist two hospitals, two police stations and
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a fire station. Now, all these crisis events have certain resource requirements. The issue is to 
optimally allocate the types and the number of units of resources required these crises.  
The resource requirements of the crisis events have been listed in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Resource Requirement of Crises 
 Ambulances Fire Engines Police Cars Towing Trucks 
Road Accident 3 0 6 1 
Building Fire 0 5 1 0 
Air-plane Crash 2 3 3 0 
Stadium Fight 2 0 7 0 
Total Req. 7 8 17 1 
 
 
Table 3.2 Resource Availability at Depots 
 Number of Units 
Available 
Number of Units 
Expendable 
Residing 
Area 
Police Station 1 10 9 A 
Police Station 2 5 5 A 
Police Station 3 4 4 B 
Hospital 1 5 5 A 
Hospital 2 4 3 A 
Fire Station 10 9 A 
Towing Agency 2 2 A 
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 Table 3.2 shows the total number of units available at each emergency response location 
as well as the number of units expendable by that location. The residing area of each response 
location is shown in the third column of the table. 
 Now, if a methodology could be formulated to optimize the allocation of one type of 
resource, be it police cars or ambulances, we can manage the allocation of resources of other 
types can also be implemented by implementing the same methodology repetitively. Since all the 
crisis events in the scenario require allocation of one or more police cars, a game for the 
allocation of police cars to the required crises locations has been formulated in the following 
sections. 
 
3.1.1 Modeling of Single Resource Type Non-Cooperative Game 
The players and the resources are two building blocks of a game theoretic setup. The 
players compete for a minimum cost allocation of available resources.  In the context of this 
work, the crisis locations are the players of game and the emergency response locations are the 
resources. Each player has a resource requirement (number of police cars in the present scenario) 
which needs to be satisfied by the resources in the vicinity. Also, each player wants to receive the 
required resources in least amount of time. So, the players do not form a coalition and play a non-
cooperative game in which each one tries to maximize its utility.    
3.1.1.1 Identification of Game Area 
In order to realize a game, the players and the resources need to satisfy the following 
condition.  
Total number of resource units required  Total availability of resources           (3.1) 
Figure 3.1 shows the existence of four players (crises) in our game area “A” and the 
resource depots (police stations) that exist in that region. The total requirement and the 
availability is displayed in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Player Requirements and Resource Availability in Area A 
The total number of expendable resource units available in current game area A is just 14 
units, which is well short of the total requirement of 17 units. This does not satisfy the necessary 
condition for the game formulation as defined in equation 3.1. So, the game area needs to be 
incremented such that the resource depots in the nearby locations are also incorporated in the 
game area and the total number of expendable resource units is at least equal to the total 
requirements. For this scenario, the game area is incremented from area A to Area B, so that a 
third resource depot that exists in area B is also included in the game.  Now the total availability 
in the combined area A + B is recalculated. Figure 3.3 shows the summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Player Requirements and Resource Availability in Area A+B 
 The new allocation satisfies the necessary condition defined in 3.1, for formulation of 
game. The next step is to associate a cost for the allocation of each unit of resource from a 
resource depot to the crisis.  
 
Total resource requirements of players = 6 + 1 + 3 + 7 = 17 units 
Total Resource Availability in Area A = 10 + 5 = 15 units 
Total number of units expendable (Area A) = 9 + 5 = 14 units 
Current game area = “A” 
Total resource requirements of players = 6 + 1 + 3 + 7 = 17 units 
Total Resource Availability = 10 + 5 + 4 = 19 units 
Total number of units expendable = 9 + 5 + 4 = 18 units 
Current game area = “A + B” 
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3.1.1.2 Allocation Cost 
Once the minimum resource requirement constraint is satisfied, the next important 
concern is to decide how to allocate the resource units to the players. In order to play a game, a 
cost associated for availing a resource unit from a depot to a crisis location is calculated. Based 
upon the costs, the players form their strategies.   
In the case of emergency management, the price (cost) is actually a function of a number 
of parameters. The parameters are:  
• Distance of Resource location from the crisis (player) 
• Degree of criticality of the crisis event 
• Number of units requested from a particular resource location 
• Minimum and Maximum speed limits on the route between resource and player 
• Traffic conditions on the route 
The cost function is also used to find the payoff for selecting a particular strategy by a 
player.  
3.1.1.3 Definition of Strategy 
 The most crucial step of realizing a game is to define a strategy for a player. In the 
scenario being discussed here, a strategy could be defined as the number of units each player 
requests from each resource location, in order to satisfy its requirements. For example, a strategy 
for the road accident which requires 6 police cars could consist of a request of 2 units of resources 
from police station 1, 1 unit from police station 2 and 3 units from police station 3. Figure 3.4 
shows a pictorial view of the requests and requirements. 
This is a simple as well as a realistic way of realizing a strategy, but when the number of 
available resource locations increase above a certain extent, the strategy set for each player 
explodes and the game could not be played because the time complexity of Nash Equilibrium 
algorithm is polynomial. So, an alternative notion of strategy has been defined.  
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Figure 3.4 Resource Requirements and Availability 
 
Initially, the allocation of the resources is done according to the minimum cost allocation 
methodology. For each player, the resources are allocated according to the sorted cost of resource 
locations for it, irrespective of the allocation of resources to the other players. After the initial 
allocation is done, for each resource location, if the total number of units allocated to the players 
is more than the number of expendable units actually available with the resource location, the 
number of overhead units is found. Now each player who was allocated one or more units of that 
resource will form a set of strategies. The strategy for each player would be the number of units it 
may have to loose in order for the resource location to be consistent i.e. the resource center is not 
allocating more than what is available with it.  
In the example scenario, assuming that the sorted order of resources for each player is as 
given in Figure 3.5, the initial allocation will be according to the results in Table 3.3. 
As shown in Table 3.3, the total allocation for Police Station 2 is 6 units, but the actual 
availability of resources at the location 5 units. So, there is a conflict of one resource unit, which 
either player 2 or player 4 would have to loose. So, for Police station 2, a game with the strategies 
C1 requires 
6 resource 
units 
R1 
R3 
R2 
3 Units 
2 Units 
1 Unit 
C1 – Crisis Location 
Ri – Resource Location 
5 Units 
Available 
 
9 Units 
Available 
 
4 Units 
Available 
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of Player 2 as {loose 0 unit, loose 1 unit} and strategies of Player 4 as {loose 0 units, loose 1 
unit} will be formulated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Sorted Orders of Resources for Players 
 
Table 3.3 Initial Resource Allocation 
 Police Station    
1 
Police Station  
2 
Police Station      
3 
Player 1 6 0 0 
Player 2 0 1 0 
Player 3 0 0 3 
Player 4 0 5 2 
Total 6 6 5 
 
 The definition of strategy ensures that there are a defined number of moves possible for 
each player and those moves are independent of the choices made by other players. This leads to 
a normal form game in which the players play their strategies simultaneously. 
  
3.1.2 Payoff 
   For each strategy chosen by a player, there is a utility (or expected utility) associated 
with it that the player would receive as a function of the selected strategy and the combination of 
Player 1 (Road accident):  Police Station 1 <  Police Station 2 < Police Station 3 
Player 2 (Building Fire):  Police Station 2 <  Police Station 1 < Police Station 3 
Player 3 (Air-plane Crash):  Police Station 3 <  Police Station 2 < Police Station 1 
Player 4 (Stadium Fight):  Police Station 2 <  Police Station 3 < Police Station 1 
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other players’ strategies.  This utility is known as the payoff paid/received by the player, 
depending upon whether the payoff is modeled as a gain or a loss to the player. 
 In our scenario, we model the payoff as a function of loss incurred to the player playing 
the strategy and gains for the other players when they play their respective strategies. A payoff 
matrix is created for each player with rows as its strategies and columns as the combination of 
other players’ strategies.  
 
3.1.3 Nash Solution 
After the payoff matrices are created for all the players playing the game, an optimal 
solution for resource allocation is found by implementing a Nash Equilibrium algorithm. The 
algorithm results socially optimal solution. For this system, the Nash Equilibrium algorithm 
described in [42] has been implemented. The algorithm is based on a combinatorial theorem [43] 
that is expressed in terms of primitive sets. Some modifications have been made to the algorithm 
in order to make it work for the proposed methodology. The algorithm accepts the payoff matrix 
as the input and generates a probability vector as the output. These probability vector values are 
used for selecting the equilibrium strategies.  
 
3.2  Notations 
 In order to formally define the problem and its solution, the following notations (figure 
3.6) have been defined for the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Notations 
P  Set of crisis locations (Players), P = {P1, P2,…,PN}  
N  Total number of players 
Q  Set of resource locations, Q = {Q1,Q2,…,QK}  
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Figure 3.6 Continued 
K   Total number of resource locations containing divisible resources  
Zi
 
  Total number of resource units required by Player Pi; i=1, 2,…,N 
qj Number of Resource units available at resource location Qj;                     
j = 1,2,…,K 
Si
 
 Set of feasible strategies of player Pi
 
S  Set of all feasible strategies in a game, S = {S1, S2, ... , SN}  
r(i)
  
Total number of strategies of player Pi 
si
b
  bth strategy of player Pi, where b = 1…r(i) 
and Si = {si1, si2,…, sir(i)} 
ui
b  Number of resource units specified in strategy b of player Pi 
ei
k
 Number of resource units requested by player Pi from the resource 
location Qk
 
ci
b
  Price which player Pi pays if it selects the strategy b 
m(i) Total number of strategies combinations of other players for a strategy 
of player Pi  
 m(i) = r(1)*r(2)*…*r(i-1)*r(i+1)*…r(N) 
Bi Set of combinations of all the strategies of players other than player Pi, 
Bi = {Bi1, Bi2, …, Bih, …, Bim(i)}  
gih(b) The gain incurred by the other players when player Pi its strategy b and 
they play the strategy combination Bih 
Xib(h) Payoff for player Pi if it plays a strategy b and other players play a 
strategy combination Bih 
Dik  Distance of player Pi from a resource location Qk
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Figure 3.5 Notations 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Continued 
 
3.3 Formulations 
• The change in average speed under the effect of varying traffic conditions on the 
route between the player (crisis location) and the resource center is given as:  
' *
k k k
i i iV V W=           (3.2) 
 
• Base Cost: The base cost i.e. the cost of allocation of a single unit of resource to the 
player is defined as: 
Yik = *( / ' )k ki i iL D V      
   =  ∞ ; if resource does not reside in game  
 area                    (3.3) 
Vik  Average speed on the route between player Pi and resource location Qk 
t’ Inter-arrival time between two resource units of same type, coming 
from same resource location 
Li Criticality level of the crisis event Pi. The values of Li range from 1 to 
10, where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the highest level of criticality 
Yik Unit Cost of resource Qk for player Pi
  
(Base Cost) 
Wik Constant for the traffic conditions on the route between player Pi and 
resource location Qk. It could have three values 0.8, 1 or 1.2 depending 
upon the traffic conditions, 0.8 when the traffic is very crowded, 1 when 
it is normal, and 1.2 when the traffic conditions are favorable i.e. there 
is not much traffic on route.  
V’ik The adjustment in average speed, which depends upon the value of Wik 
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• Cost Function: Cost of a strategy for a player is defined as the overhead which the 
player Pi
 
pays for loosing the number of units specified in the strategy and getting 
those units allocated from the next available resource location in order to satisfy the 
requirements.  
• Payoff Function: Payoff function is a function of the Cost overhead for the player Pi 
and the combined gains incurred by other players when Pi
 
plays the strategy sib and 
the other players play the strategy combination Bih.  We model the payoff as the 
combined minimization function.  
Xib(h)
 
 = ci
b
 + gih(b); if the strategy 
 combination is valid 
                 = ∞ ; otherwise         (3.4) 
       
Valid strategy combination is the one in which the total number of units being sacrificed 
by the player Pi playing strategy b and the sum of units sacrificed by all other players by playing 
strategy combination  Bih, is equal to the overhead allocation. 
 
3.4 Objective 
The objective for each player is to minimize the gains incurred by other players and to 
minimize its own loss for playing a particular strategy.  Objective function is: 
    Minimize (Xib(h))         (3.5) 
 
In this chapter, a non-cooperative normal form game was formulated for a multi-event 
crisis scenario where the crisis locations require some resources to be allocated for recovery and 
the resources are limited in quantity. In such a situation, for each such resource type there is a 
competition among the crises for allocation. Hence, a game theoretic formulation for optimal 
resource allocation was proposed. The notations were also specified and explained in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 4 
NASH EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION 
  
 In this chapter, an algorithm for the actual implementation of allocation of resources to 
the players will be provided. The discussion will encompass all the steps from identification of 
the region that would be included in the game, to the implementation of Nash Equilibrium 
algorithm for optimal allocation of required resources to the players.  
In the last section of the chapter, the software architecture of the proposed system will be 
discussed in details. This would identify the appropriate place of the proposed subsystem for 
optimal resource allocation in the domain of emergency management system like FEMA.  The 
chapter will conclude with a short discussion on the Nash Equilibrium methodology being used.  
A top level workflow view of the proposed methodology is described in Figure 4.10. It 
specifies the sequence of operations that are carried in order to generate an optimal solution.  
  
4.1 Requirement Analysis 
At a particular time stamp, one or more crisis locations may exist in a region. The very first step 
in the algorithm is to identify those crises and their resource requirements. The system also has 
information about the resources available in that region. Once the resource requirements are 
identified, the algorithm checks if the total number of requested resource units are available in the 
initial game region. If the current game area is short of resources, the area is incremented to the 
point that the system finds another resource center. Now the verification step is executed again to 
check if the total request by all the crises can be satisfied in the increased area. 
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This cycle continues till we have enough resources available with us to satisfy the requirements 
of all the crises. 
 Figure 4.1 explains the steps followed in the requirement analysis step. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Requirement Analysis 
 
4.2 Cost of Resources 
Once the game area is determined on the basis of requirements and the availability, the 
price that a crisis location will have to pay for the potential allocation of resource units from a 
resource location is computed. The cost is calculated for each player and for each resource 
location. The cost function is defined in Equation 3.3. The next important step is to sort the 
resources in non-decreasing order of cost for each resource. The sorting is required because the 
initial allocation in the implementation is the minimum cost allocation.  
For sorting the resources Quick Sort Algorithm has been implemented, because the 
average case time complexity of algorithm is ( log )n nΘ . The worst case for quick sort surfaces 
when the array is already sorted. In that case, the performance is 2( )nΘ . The algorithms 
performs an in-place sorting i.e. it does not require additional space for sorting. Also, the sorting 
1. For the initial game area, find the total requirements of all the crisis locations 
1
N
i
i
z z
=
=  
2. In the initial region (1), find the total number of resource units available. 
1
K
j
j
q q
=
=  
3. If z > q then 
3.1. Increment the region till a new resource depot is found. 
3.2. Add the resource depot to the list of available resource depots and then go to    
step 2. 
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is stable and has a small constant factor. Small constant factor ensures that the time-complexity 
expressed in terms of theta is realistic and the actual time required by the algorithm is a very 
small multiple (of nlogn or n2). [55] 
 The cost module is described in Figure 4.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Cost of Resources 
 
4.3 Allocation 
After the resources are sorted in the increasing order of cost for each crisis location, the 
following steps are performed in sequence.  
• Initial Allocation: A minimum cost allocation of resources to the crisis location is 
carried out, irrespective of the allocation to other players.  
• Verify Allocation: After the initial allocation is made, it is verified that for each 
resource location, the sum of the allocations made to all the crises is less than or 
equal to the total number of resource units available with the resource depot. If the 
total allocation is more than the total availability, a game is required to be played for 
reallocation of the extra units of conflicting resources.  
The module is described in Figure 4.3.  
 
 
1. For each crisis location in the scenario do,  
1.1.    Find the base cost of receiving a single unit of resource from each resource    
location. The cost function is Yik where i∈N and k∈K.  
1.2.    Create an array overheadCost of the K elements and store the cost values and 
the corresponding array index number in array. 
1.3.    Call the QuickSort module and pass the array to the function.  
1.4.    QuickSort module returns the array, sorted in non-decreasing order of cost and   
keeping the array index number along with the cost value.  
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Figure 4.3 Initial Allocation 
 
 
4.4 Generation of Strategy 
If there is no conflict found during the verification step, the allocation would be the most 
optimal allocation because each crisis receives the resources at the lowest possible cost and the 
complete system is in the optimum state. But, if the verification step finds a conflict in resource 
allocation, i.e. it detects a condition when there is at least one resource location with number of 
units allocated greater than the number of units actually available, a game is required to be played 
for each such resource center.  
1. Initial Allocation 
1.1. For each crisis location do 
1.1.1. Define remRequirement ←  zi as remaining number of units required 
1.1.2. Allocate the remRequirement number of units to the crisis location such 
that the crisis first receives all the available units from the resource 
location with minimum cost and then the remaining requirements from 
the next resource location in the sorted order and so on, till the total 
requirements of the crisis location are satisfied.  
1.2. Store the complete allocation in a N*K matrix called allocationMatrix 
2. Verify Allocation 
2.1. For each resource location do 
2.1.1. Calculate the total number of units allocated to all the crisis locations 
2.2. Store the total allocation count for each resource location in an array 
conflictResource. 
2.3. For count from 1 to k do 
2.3.1. If conflictResource[count] > qcount then  
2.3.1.1. There is a conflict in allocation and we need to play a game. 
2.3.1.2. Exit from this module. Go to the strategy generation module. 
2.4. If none of the resource locations are in conflict then allocation is an optimal 
allocation. Exit successfully.  
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The strategy for each crisis location is defined as the number of units it can loose in order 
for the resource location to reach a consistent state. A criticality level (Li) is associated with each 
crisis that decides the sequence in which games are to be played. If more than one resource 
location is in conflict, then we will first select the conflicting resource center which is the least 
cost resource center for the highest criticality level crisis location that is part of the conflict and 
play a game for that center. Once a game is played for the resource center and the overhead 
allocation is removed from that location and reallocated to the next available resource centers (in 
sorted order of their costs) for the players of the game, that center attains a consistent equilibrium 
allocation state. The algorithm then moves on to the next conflicting resource location and repeats 
the same process, but it takes into consideration that the resource locations that have attained a 
consistent state are not affected.  
Figure 4.4 discusses the steps involved in generation of strategy in detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Generation of Strategy 
 
 
1. Find total number of conflicting resource locations and units 
1.1. For count = 1 to k do 
1.1.1. If conflictResource[count] > qcount then 
1.1.1.1. conflictingUnitCount[count] ←   conflictResource[count]- qcount 
1.1.1.2 conflictingResourceLocations++ 
1.1.2 Else 
1.1.2.1 conflictingUnitCount[count] ← 0 
2. Select resource location for game 
2.1.  For criticality level m from 1 to 3 do 
2.1.1. For each crisis location i do 
2.1.1.1. If Li == m then 
 For each resource location k in i’s sorted order do 
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Figure 4.4 Continued 
 
 
 
If allocationMatrix[i][k] > 0 and        
conflictingUnitCount[k] 0 Then 
   Go to GenerateStrategy(k) 
2 GenerateStrategy(k) 
2.1 For each crisis location i do 
2.1.1 If allocationMatrix[i][k]>0 then 
2.1.1.1 If conflictingUnitCount[k] > allocationMatrix[i][k] then 
 strategyCount[i] = allocationMatrix[i][k]+1 
2.1.1.2 Else 
 strategyCount[i] = conflictingUnitCount[k]+1 
2.1.2 Else 
2.1.2.1 strategyCount[i] = 1 
2.2 For each crisis location i do 
2.2.1 If strategyCount[i] > 1 Then, include the crisis in game otherwise do 
not include. 
2.2.1.1 Create an array stratArray[i] with size equal to strategyCount[i] 
2.2.1.2 Create a strategyCost[i] array of same size, which will store the 
loss incurred by the player for each strategy. 
2.2.1.3 Strategy for a player is the number of units it may need to loose and 
the cost of each strategy is the number of units lost * 
overheadCost[k] 
  stratArray[i] = {0, 1, 2, …, strategyCount[i]-1} 
strategyCost[i] = {0*overheadCost[k], 1* overheadCost[k], …,   
(strategyCount[i]-1)* overheadCost[k]} 
2.3 After creating a strategy array for each player in the game, call the payoff 
matrix module. 
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4.5       Formulation of Payoff Matrix 
After the strategy set for each player of the game is finalized, the next important step is to 
formulate a payoff matrix for each player. The payoff matrix for a player i is of the size r(i) * 
m(i). Each cell of the payoff matrix for a player contains a payoff value which is defined in 
Equation 3.4.  
For a player Pi whose payoff matrix is being formulated, corresponding to each strategy it 
plays, all the other players play their own strategies. These players acquire some gain due to loss 
of player Pi, which is greater than or equal to zero. The gain acquired for each set of strategy 
combination in payoff matrix is calculated by implementing a recursive function. Figure 4.6 
explains all the steps that are involved in formulation of payoff matrix. 
A sample payoff matrix for a player Pi is displayed in Figure 4.5 
Pi Bi
1
 Bi2 … Bim(i) 
si
1
 
Xi1(1) Xi1(2) … Xi1(m(i)) 
si
2
 
Xi2(1) Xi2(2) … Xi2(m(i)) 
… … … … … 
si
r(i)
 
Xir(i)(1) Xir(i)(2) … Xir(i)(m(i)) 
 
Figure 4.5 Payoff Matrix 
After formulating, the payoff matrix is passed to the Nash Equilibrium function, which 
calculates the probability vectors that decide the strategy combination to be chosen.  
 
4.6        Nash Equilibrium Solution 
After the payoff matrix is formulated for all the players of the game, Nash Equilibrium 
solution is found by implementing the algorithm provided by Scarf-Hansen fixed Point theorem 
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[42,43] to approximate Nash Equilibrium point in an N-person non-cooperative game. The 
algorithm is based on a combinatorial theorem [42] which is expressed in terms of a primitive set.  
Considering X to be a collection of n-dimensional vector X = (x1,…,xh) of the form (m1 /D, ..., mh 
/D)’ with each mk greater than or equal to -1 and summing up to D which is a very large integer 
(mostly a multiple of the number of crises).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Formulation of Payoff Matrix 
 
 
 
1. Total number of strategies combinations of other players 
1.1. For each player i do 
1.1.1. For each player j ≠  i do 
1.1.1.1. NumCols[i] = NumCols[i] * strategyCount[j] 
2. Create a payoff matrix 
2.1. For each player i do 
2.1.1. Create a two dimensional array Pays[i] of size 
strategyCount[i]*NumCols[i](=m(i)). This is the payoff matrix for 
player Pi,  
2.1.2. Call recCombiCost() that calculates the gains of other players’ strategy 
combinations and returns an array returnArr[numCols]containing the 
gains for all such strategy combinations. 
2.1.3. For each  j from 1 to strategyCount[i] do 
2.1.3.1. For each r from 1 to NumCols[i] do 
 If ( sacrifice units of Bij+sij ==conflictingUnitCount[k]) 
  Pays[i][j][r]=strategyCost[i][j]+returnArr[r] 
 Else 
  Pays[i][j][r]= ∞  
3. Call Nash Equilibrium function and pass the payoff matrix Pays, number of Players 
and number of strategies of each player to the function. 
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Now,  
M =
11 12 1
21 22 2
1 2
...
...
... ...
...
N
N
N N NN
m m m
m m m
m m m
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The columns of matrix M represent the numerators on n vectors in X [42]. Matrix M is a 
primitive set iff and there is a rearrangement of the columns and a permutation of the labels of the 
columns, I(l) such that: 
 1. The lth column of M is identical to column l-1, except for the two rows I(l)-1 and I(l) 
2. mk,l = mk,l-1 + 1 for k = I(l)-1 
    mk,l = mk,l-1 – 1 for k = I(l) 
Note: For l = 1, l-1 = h. Similarly, I(l) = 1, I(l) – 1 = h 
 The Nash Equilibrium algorithm based upon this concept of Primitive set is detailed in 
Figure 4.7. The algorithm accepts the payoff matrices, number of players n and X as input and 
generates an output that is a set of output vectors p.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Nash Equilibrium Algorithm 
1. Select D such that it is a multiple of N where N is the number of Players 
2. Calculate h = 
1
N
i
i
r
=
  – N +1 
3. Let xj be an arbitrary nonnegative vector from X. We associate it with the probability 
vectors ( 1 2, ,....j j jNp p p ) in the following way: 
t0 = 0 and ti = ri -1 where i = 1, 2,..., N and ri is the number of strategies of player 
Pi 
3.1. Define 
   
1
0
1
i
ki v
v
u t k
−
=
= + + ; where k = 1, ...., ti  and i = 1,...... ,N 
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Figure 4.7 Continued 
 
4.7 Reallocation 
The Nash Equilibrium approximation algorithm returns a probability vector on the basis 
of which the reallocation of resources to the players is carried out. The game has been played for 
one resource location which was in conflict, so once the optimal strategy set is found, the number 
of units to be sacrificed by each player according to the selected strategy are reallocated from the 
next available least cost locations. Since, the resource location for which the game has been 
played just now is in consistent state, the location is labeled as “consistent” and no player in 
following iterations of the game can change the resource allocation at that location. Marking a 
   
, ki
j j
k i up N x= ⋅ ;  where k = 1, ...., ti  and i = 1,...... ,N 
   
, ,
1
1
i
i
t
j j
r i k i
i
p p
=
= −  where j ikp ,  0 
 
4. While label of xj  1 do 
4.1. If 
,i
j
r ip   0 then 
4.1.1. Let Bki = Bki ( 1 1 1,.., , ....j j j ji i Np p p p− + ) be the expected payoff to a player    
if  it uses its kth strategy and such that ki is the lowest index for which 
  ikiB ( 1 1 1,.., , ....
j j j j
i i Np p p p− + )  Bki ( 1 1 1,.., , ....j j j ji i Np p p p− + ) 
  Then, the vector xj is labeled
1
0
1
i
w i
w
t k
−
=
+ + ;   
      where i = min{
,
|
l
j
r ll p > 0 and kl  ri} 
4.2. If 
,i
j
r ip < 0 OR ,i
j
r ip = 0 for all i OR ki = ri for all i with ,i
j
r ip  > 0 then 
4.2.1. xj is labeled 1  
4.2.2. Exit from algorithm an return the probability vector to the calling 
function. 
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resource location as consistent ensures that the algorithm is not undirected and is moving towards 
the desired solution.  
The sequences of operations carried out in the reallocation stage have been delineated in 
the Figure 4.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Reallocation Algorithm 
 
 The above mentioned modules are executed repetitively until the Verify Allocation 
module ensures that none of the resource locations are have allocated more resource units than 
they actually have. When such a situation arises, the algorithm successfully terminates returning 
the final optimal allocation of resources to the crisis locations. Also, solution of each iteration of 
the game is a Nash Equilibrium solution, so the solution of the complete system also a Nash 
Equilibrium solution.   
 
4.8       Why Terje-Hansen Algorithm? 
The algorithm being implemented for finding the solution of the game is Terje-Hansen 
approximation algorithm. Herbert Scarf’s fixed point theorem (in collaboration with Terje 
1. Reallocation 
1.1. According to the probability vector returned by the Nash Equilibrium 
algorithm, for each player, select the strategy which is assigned highest 
probability. 
1.2. For each player do 
1.2.1. The number of units of resources to be sacrificed according to the 
selected strategy is removed from the resource.  
1.2.2. The sacrificed units are allocated from next available resource locations 
in player’s sorted order that that have units available with them and are 
not marked as “consistent”. 
1.3. Call the Verify Allocation module with new allocation matrix. 
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Hansen) which is used as the basis for approximation of Nash Equilibria is considered to be the 
most successful and most implemented theorem. The solution generated by the algorithm is a 
probability vector and not a specific strategy combination or a set of combination. So it provides 
a generalized solution and the decision of choosing the strategies according to the probability 
vector values is left at the player’s discretion. The time of convergence of solution can be 
controlled by the players playing the game. Also, the methodology works well for two player 
games as well as multiple player games and provides stable results.  
 
4.9 Software Architecture 
Emergency management is a vast area that incorporates everything from the 
identification of an anomaly in the system as a crisis, to the response and recovery from that 
crisis. After recovery, the critical process of mitigation of its effects, the risk analysis and a better 
preparedness for those types of crises are also integral parts of the emergency management 
system.  A detailed study of the life cycle of a crisis [1] was performed in chapter 1 of this work 
and is diagrammatically described in Figure 1.1. A multi-event resource allocation and 
management system has been proposed in this work. The proposed system is an integral part of 
the emergency management system and performs the actual physical allocation of resources to 
the crisis locations.  
The system tries to optimally allocate the resource units which are available in a limited 
quantity, to the crisis locations existing in the system at some point of time. Figure 4.9 shows the 
top level view of an emergency management system. The proposed resource allocation system 
fits in the response module of the main system which itself consists of a set of four activities 
including alert, assessment deployment and monitoring. The proposed system is an integral part 
of deployment module which is the shaded block in figure 4.9.  
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 Figure 4.9 Position of Resource Allocation System 
 
4.9.1 System Input and Output 
Our system receives a set of different inputs for each crisis location from the automated 
systems like the GPS system or a GIS system. The inputs are used to calculate the cost and 
payoffs for each crisis location in order to provide an optimal allocation of resources to it. The 
inputs and outputs of the system are defined below. 
Inputs: 
• Number of crises (2 to 6) 
• Number of emergency response centers (3- 17) 
 
Alert system 
Crisis Damage Assessment 
Deployment of Resources 
Monitoring System  
Response 
Recovery 
Information Update 
Mitigation and Risk 
Analysis 
Preparedness 
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• Number of response units at each resource center (12-40) 
• Resource request of each crisis (<=60) 
• Criticality level of each crisis (vary from 1 to 10, 1 being the most critical and 10 being 
least critical) 
• Response time for receiving units from each location to each crisis location (in seconds) 
Outputs: 
• The final allocation of resources to each crisis location.  
 
4.9.2 Object Oriented Modeling 
The proposed system has been implemented in C++ programming language because the 
modeling of the problem is most realistic in an object oriented paradigm. The complete system is 
a collection of objects which interact with each other in order to accomplish the goal of optimal 
resource allocation. For example, the resource centers and the crisis locations are real world 
objects which are interacting with each other to receive the best allocation.  
Additionally, there are other advantages of modeling the problem in an object oriented 
paradigm. The complete system is divided into specific logical classes which identify each 
individual component of the system which performs certain functions and has some data 
structures associated with it. The classes provide an ease of reusability of its functions. Also, the 
program is more manageable if it is logically modularized. This functionality is best provided by 
a class.  
Another important aspect of object oriented design is its capability of providing data 
abstraction and encapsulation. The system acts as a black-box for the external users. A set of 
interfaces are provided to the end user, which in this case is an automated system that provides 
inputs to the system, the outputs are generated by the system and are supplied to the user through 
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an interface. The functionality of the system is completely hidden from the end user, which 
ensures ease of use and system security.  
 
4.9.3 Overview of Classes and Functions 
The system defines the following classes in the implementation: 
 
Table 4.1 Overview of the Classes 
Class Attributes Behavior 
GameArea Initial Area, Availability, 
Requirements 
• Identification of final game area 
Cost Unit Cost, Sorted Cost • Identification of the cost of each 
resource unit for each player.  
• Sorting of resource locations in 
increasing order of cost for each crisis 
location 
Allocation Sorted cost, Allocation 
Matrix 
• According to the sorted order of cost, 
initial allocation is done 
• Allocation is verified for conflicts 
• If conflict exist, then for each 
conflicting resource location a game is 
played 
• Reallocation is done according to Nash 
Equilibrium results. 
StrategyGenerator Allocation Matrix, 
Conflicting players, sorted 
cost 
• If conflict exists, the strategy set is 
generated for each player, which is 
number of units each player looses.  
• Cost of each strategy is calculated 
Game Payoff Matrix • A payoff matrix is formulated for each 
player.   
NashEquilibrium Probability Vectors • Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated 
 
 59 
The following functions have been implemented in the classes.  
SatisfyRequirements(): 
• Class: GameArea 
• Input: Requirements, Availability, Initial Game Area 
• Output: Final Game Area 
BaseCost() 
• Class: Cost 
• Input: Crisis Parameters; distance, speed, criticality 
• Output: Base cost from each location for each player 
SortCost() 
• Class: Cost 
• Input: base cost 
• Output: Call to QuickSort() 
QuickSort() 
• Class: Cost 
• Input: base cost 
• Output: sorted cost array for each crisis location 
InitialAllocation() 
• Class: Allocation 
• Input: sorted cost array, requirements, availability 
• Output: Minimum cost allocation matrix 
VerifyAllocation() 
• Class: Allocation 
• Input: allocation matrix 
• Output: final allocation if no conflict and call to GenereateStrategy() if conflict 
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ReAllocation() 
• Class: Allocation 
• Input: Probability vector 
• Output: allocation matrix based on the reallocation 
GenerateStrategy() 
• Class: StrategyGenerator 
• Input: allocation matrix, cost, conflict resource and crises 
• Output: Strategy set for each player 
GameMatrixGen() 
• Class: Game 
• Input: strategy set for each player 
• Output: payoff Matrix for each player 
recCombiCost() 
• Class: Game 
• Input: strategy set of a player 
• Output: payoffs of all other players for each strategy of input player 
Nash_Nplayer_3Competitor() 
• Class: NashEquilibrium 
• Input: payoff matrix of all the players  
• Output: probability vector of nash equilibrium solution 
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Figure 4.10 Workflow Model of System 
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 In this chapter, the algorithm that has been implemented for optimal allocation of 
resources to the crises locations in a multiple crisis environment was described in details. A 
pseudo-code was presented and discussed for each module of the system. Also, the rationale 
behind using the Terje Hansen algorithm as the Nash Equilibrium methodology was discussed. 
The last section of the chapter provided a detailed description of the software architecture of the 
system.
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter presents the experiments that were performed to evaluate the apposition of 
the proposed game theoretic model for multi-crisis resource management system. Analysis of the 
experimental results provided some key observations that are vital for the implementation of such 
real time emergency management systems. The chapter studies some of these observations and 
their effect on the proposed system.  
Response time is the key attribute that determines the practicality of an emergency 
management system. Experiments were conducted to determine the response time of the system. 
The effect of each component; number of players, number of resource location and the number of 
resource units at each location, on the response time of system was studied and is been presented 
using comparative charts and graphs. The experimental test set consisted of a realistic set of 
conditions that would exist in a multiple crisis scenario. For example, at any particular time, there 
maximum of four to five crises with a total requirement of no more than 100 units of resources 
can occur in a locality.  
The rationale behind the choice of game theoretic methodology for multi-crisis resource 
allocation scenario is the existence of fairness of allocation. A quantitative analysis of fairness of 
the system was performed and the fairness was compared with the minimum cost allocation 
methodology. The proposed system outperformed the other methodology. Also, a comparative 
study was performed for the difference between the total cost of allocation of resources to the 
highest priority player against the lowest priority player, and the results justified the choice of 
proposed methodology.  
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5.1 Experimental Setup 
Experiments were conducted on a test set that consisted of at most six players, each 
player requesting a maximum 60 units of resources with a total system wide requirement of 
utmost 150 resource units. The number of resource centers in a locality was varied from three to 
seventeen. The values of the attributes like the distance from source to destination, the average 
speed on the route and the criticality of the crisis event were randomly generated.  
The experiments were executed on a SunOS system with each experimental result being 
an average of fifty iterations on the same set of players and resources with randomly varying 
values of distance, velocity and criticality. A total of around 7000 tests were performed and the 
results were stored in text files. The execution time of the algorithm was calculated using the 
functions of <sys/timeb.h> library. The specifications of the Sun system are listed in Figure 5.1. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of experimental test set.  
 The results obtained from execution of experiments were graphically analyzed using 
Microsoft Excel. MS Excel was also use for finding the fitness of the proposed model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 System Details 
 
System   SunOS 
Node   sunblast 
Release   5.9 
KernelID   Generic_112233-11 
Machine   sun4u 
OEM#    0 
Origin#   1 
NumCPU   8 
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Table 5.1 Experimental Setup 
Number of Crisis Locations 2 – 6 
Maximum Request by a crisis  <= 60 
Total Request by all crises <= 150 
Number of Resource Centers 3 – 17 
Units available at each resource center >= 12 
Test Cases 7014 
 
 
5.2 Execution Time Analysis 
 Time of convergence of the Nash Equilibrium algorithm is the most significant 
component in the total execution time of the game theoretic algorithm. Test cases were executed 
with permutations of varying number of resource location, resource units and number of crisis 
locations in order to identify the prominent conditions that contribute towards the execution time 
of the algorithm.  
 
5.2.1 Effect of Resource Units  
 In the first test scenario, the algorithm was executed with variable number of resource 
units at the resource locations. The number of resource locations was kept constant and different 
series were generated for different number of crises. Each test case was executed fifty times and 
the average of execution times was calculated. This ensured that a major portion of the possible 
permutations for allocation were incorporated in the test set.  Figure 5.2 shows the graph that was 
obtained for the test case with number of resource locations as 10 and the total number of units 
requested by crises as 60.  
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Figure 5.2 Dependence of Execution Time on Number of Resources 
 
5.2.1.1 Observations and Analysis 
 The graph generated for different number of crises events, followed a particular trend. It 
was observed that as the number of resource units available at each location increases, the 
convergence time of the algorithm decreases. This is attributed to the fact that if more units are 
available at each location, the location can allocate more resources to the players and the 
contention for resources would be less. But, after a certain limit, the convergence time again 
increases. This is because if there are too many units available at a resource center and the 
resource center is the lowest cost center for more than one player, then those players would try to 
receive maximum available units from that location, thereby resulting in a game with large 
strategy set. Hence, having a large number of units at resource center could actually attribute 
towards an increase in the convergence time of the system. 
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5.2.2 Effect of Resource Locations 
The number of resource centers was varied for the second set of test cases. If a game was 
played with each player’s strategy being the number of resources requested from each resource 
location, the strategy set would have exploded if the number of resource locations were beyond 
nine locations. The same behavior was expected from the proposed methodology. But, the test 
cases executed with the number resource centers varying from 3 to 17, keeping the total number 
of resource units constant, provided some interesting and useful observations about the working 
of algorithm.  
The logarithmic graphs were plotted for the test results because the range of execution 
time was very wide and there were considerable number of output values within a very small 
range (0-1 seconds). Figure 5.3 shows the average executions time of the algorithm for varying 
resource locations. This graph, though shows the behavior of the program, conceals some 
quantitatively important values of actual execution times in worst case scenarios. In order to 
study those values, another logarithmic graph was plotted with the peak value of the set of 
outputs. The graph is displayed in Figure 5.4.  
 
5.2.2.1 Observations and Analysis 
 As evident from the general trends in the graphs shown in Figure 5.3 and 5.4, the 
execution time of the algorithm is very high when the number of resource centers is very limited 
(between 3 to 5). This is due to the fact that when the number of resource centers is very limited, 
all the crises would have some allocation of units from most of resource centers. This would lead 
to a series of games that needs to be played for the optimal allocation. An increase in the number 
of games would lead to an increase in the total execution time of the algorithm. Conversely, as 
the number of resource locations increase, the sort order for all the players is different and the 
resources are allocated from different resource centers leading to a lower contention rate and 
hence a lower execution time.  
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Figure 5.3 Dependence of Average Execution Time on Resource Centers 
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Figure 5.4 Dependence of Peak Execution Time on Resource Centers 
 
 69 
5.2.3 Effect of Distribution of Resource Units 
 Another set of tests were executed on the algorithm to identify the effect of amount of 
resource availability on the convergence time of the algorithm. Ideally, an increment in the 
availability of resource units would have resulted in a significant decrease in the convergence 
time because of the availability of larger set of resource for the crises.  
 The results generated from the experiments conducted for a four player game with 
varying number of resource units at each location are described in Figure 5.5. 
 
5.2.3.1 Observations and Analysis 
 One of the most important observations from this set of experiments was the 
establishment of the idea that excess availability of the resources does not always ensure a 
smaller execution time. According to the results, if the total availability of resources is up to 
125% of the request, the algorithm converges with a small convergence time (as shown in Figure 
5.5). The performance actually degrades in terms of execution time when the availability is 150% 
or more than the request. This occurs because in some cases in this situation, since the number of 
units available at each location is more, if more than one player has the same sorted order of 
resource centers as some of the other players, there will be more resource units in conflict at that 
location. This would result in a bigger game and hence would take longer to converge.   
 
5.3 Fairness of Solution 
The rationale for modeling the multi-crisis resource management system is to provide an 
optimal allocation of resources to the crises while ensuring the fairness of solution. Qualitatively, 
fairness is defined as an allocation that is fair for each player of the system as well as for the 
system itself. Nash Equilibrium solution for a game theoretic implementation provides a socially 
optimal solution in which each player receives its best utility if other players adhere to the 
allocation made to them.  
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Figure 5.5 Dependence of Execution Time on Excess Resource Availability 
 
The quantitative measure of fairness for a system can be determined by identifying if the 
system meets certain criteria on throughput and delay. If the system does meet these criteria it is 
deemed to be unfair. In the scenario of multiple crises, fairness would be determined by whether 
or not a crisis receives its fair share of resources.  
A methodology for quantitative measure of the fairness of resource allocation in domain 
of computer networks has been discussed in [56]. The methodology identifies the fair proportion 
of the resources which a user should receive according to its weighting and the proportion which 
the user actually received, and finds the user’s weighted self fairness or unfairness value. These 
self fairness values are then used to calculate the weighted average fairness of the system.  
The concept defined in [56] was used to find the self fairness of each player of the game 
the multi-crisis scenario and the self fairness values were used to find the average fairness of the 
system. In this scenario the weighting of each player is identified by its level of criticality and 
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amount of request. Figure 5.6 describes the methodology in details. The value of average fairness 
of a system for N users ranges from 0 to 1 inclusive. The maximum value of fairness is unity 
which is obtained when each player (user) of the system consumes its weighted fair allocation.  
 The measure of fairness of system in our scenario will be determined by comparing total 
cost of the actual allocation made to the player by implementing Nash Equilibrium optimization 
algorithm with the fair allocation that the player should have received according to its level of 
criticality and total requirements. The quantitative value of system wide fairness was calculated 
by implementing the methodology being described in Figure 5.6.  
 The value of fairness was calculated for different sets of parameters; number of players, 
resource location and the number of units per location and the results are described in Table 5.2 
Table 5.2 Fairness Measure 
Number of 
Crises 
Resource 
Locations 
Resource Units 
per Location 
Requirements 
(units) 
Average 
Fairness 
3 5 22 100 0.853252 
4 5 25 100 0.6976 
5 5 23 100 0.953268 
6 5 21 100 0.886795 
4 7 15 100 0.84533 
4 9 12 100 0.793 
 
 In all the test cases, the average fairness of the system was in the range of 0.68 – 0.96, 
which is a good measure of fairness.  
The measure of fairness in the game theoretic setup was then compared with the 
minimum cost allocation methodology where the allocation of resources to the players is done on 
the basis of their criticality levels. The highest priority players receive the resources in the 
increasing order of their costs, followed by the lower priority players receiving the remaining 
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resource units. The comparative results for a scenario with five resource locations are shown in 
Figure 5.7. The results of the graph establish the fact that the Nash Equilibrium provides a fair 
allocation of resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Measure of Fairness 
 
 
1.   Weighting of Player Pi 
Weighting ri of the player Pi is defined as the product of required number of units 
for the player and the reciprocal of its criticality level.  
ri = Zi * (1/Li) 
2. Fair Allocation 
Fair allocation is defined as the proportion of the total allocation which a player 
should receive. This is defined as the weighting of the player divided by sum of the 
weightings of all other players.  
pfair, i = ri / 
1
N
k
k
r
=
  
3. Actual Allocation 
The actual proportion of allocation to the player Pi is the cost of allocation of 
resources to that player divided by the total cost of the system.  
pi =
1
[ ] / [ ]
N
final i final k
k
c p c p
=
  
4. Weighted Self Fairness 
      Weighted self fairness of each player Pi is defined as: 
,
log( ) / log( )i i fair ip pℑ =  
       The values of pi and  pfair, i are normalized to stay in the range between 0 and 0.3679 
5.    Normalization Constant 
      The normalization constant for the average system fairness is defined as:  
,
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Figure 5.6 Continued 
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Figure 5.7 Fairness Performances against Minimum Cost Allocation 
 
 
 
 
6.   Weighted Average Fairness of System 
      The weighted average fairness of the system is:  
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5.4 Statistical Significance of Results 
 Regression analysis was performed on the test data to find the statistical significance of 
the results. Table 5.3 summarizes the results of regression test.  
 
Table 5.3 Regression Analysis Results 
 
 Coefficient of 
Independence (Log) 
P – Value R Square Value 
Number of Crisis 
Locations (Log) 
1.79 0.000279 0.297 
Number of Resource 
Locations (Log) 
-1.345 7.75E-05 0.34 
Number of Resource 
Units per Location (Log) 
-0.123 0.096 0.014 
 
5.4.1 Coefficient of Independence 
The coefficient of independence determines the relationship between the dependent 
(execution time) and independent (number of crisis locations, number of resource locations and 
number of resource units at each location) variables. A positive value of coefficient of 
independence reveals a direct relationship between the dependent and independent variables and a 
negative value identifies an inverse relationship. In the crisis management scenario, the Number 
of crises is directly related to the execution time and the number of resource locations and 
resource units are inversely related. The value 1.1533124 means that if log of the number of 
crises in the system increases by one unit, the log of execution time of the algorithm would 
increase by 1.79 milliseconds. Similarly, an increase in log of one resource location or one 
resource unit at a location would result in decrease of log value of execution time by 1.345 
milliseconds seconds and 0.123 milliseconds respectively.  
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5.4.2 P – Value 
The P – Value presents the statistical significance of the results obtained by executing the 
test set. For the crisis management scenario, the results were found to be significant at 10% 
confidence level. The number of units per location variable has a P – Value of 0.096, which 
signifies that there is 90.4% confidence that the test set results are representative of the actual 
results that would be obtained from the complete solution set. Similarly, for the number of 
resource locations and the number of players, the confidence is very high.  
 
5.4.3 R Square Value 
R Square values determine the fitness of model. The results obtained from the regression 
test provide an R Square value of 0.297 for the number of crisis location. It means that the crisis 
location factor governs the model fitness by 29.7%. The remaining 70.3% fitness of the model is 
governed by the factors other than crisis locations. Number of resource locations and the number 
of resource units at each location determines 35.4% of the fitness factors.  
 The chapter presented the relationship between various attributes of a multi-event crisis 
management scenario being modeled as a game theoretic system. The effect of these attributes on 
the convergence time of the algorithm was studied and some significant inferences were derived. 
It was identified that if the availability of total resources is more that 25% above the total 
requests, the performance of the system may actually degrade. Similarly, the test cases identified 
that an increase in the number of resource locations actually leads towards a better converge time. 
The fairness of the methodology was evaluated quantitatively, which fortified the decision of 
modeling of the system as a game. Finally, a regression test was performed on the experimental 
test set to ensure that the test set was representative of the actual solution space. It provided a 
quantitative relationship between the dependent and independent attributes of the system.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
 In this thesis work, a novel game theoretic approach for multi-event crisis management 
was proposed. The methodology identifies the crisis events as the players and the emergency 
response centers as the resource locations available in the system. Each crisis location, according 
to the severity of the incident, requests for some resources to be allocated to it. In a scenario 
where multiple crises exist and there is a limited availability of resources, the crises compete for 
the allocation of resource units. In the proposed approach, each crisis location starts with the 
minimum cost allocation of resources. If a conflict situation originates at any resource location, a 
game is formulated for reallocation of conflicting number of units to other locations. Nash 
Equilibrium optimization algorithm has been implemented for allocation. The rationale behind 
using Nash Equilibrium algorithm is the fact that it provides a solution which is fair for each 
player of the system as well as for the system itself. The fairness of solution was quantitatively 
analyzed and was against the minimum cost allocation methodology. The results endorsed the 
aptness of proposed game theoretic methodology for multi-event crisis management.  
The methodology was tested with a test set of more than 7000 experiments. The analysis 
of the test results provided important insights into the relationship between the number of 
resource locations, the crises, number of resource units at each location and the time of 
convergence of algorithm. A regression test was performed on the test set to establish the 
statistical significance of the results and it was identified that the test set was representative of the
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actual solution space, at a 10% confidence level. The value of coefficient of independence 
provided a quantitative measure of the dependence for execution time on the independent 
variables like the number of players and the number of resource locations etc.  
The proposed game theoretic framework is the most apposite architecture for multi-event 
crisis management, because a condition modeled as a game with Nash Equilibrium as the 
optimization algorithm achieves a social optima by providing fair allocation of resources to all the 
crises in the system according to their criticality levels in an optimum time.  
 
6.2 Future Work 
The future work would focus on generalization of the proposed methodology for a 
dynamic scenario where the crisis events occurring dynamically would be monitored and serviced 
in real time. In such a scenario, as soon as a new crisis would occur in a locality, it would be 
included in the system and the process of allocation of resources would restart from that point. 
Here, the distribution of resources would change because resources that were already allocated to 
the crises locations would either be at the source, at the destination or in transit. So, the 
reallocation of some of those resources may be required according to the criticality of new event.  
As the next step of research in this domain, a framework would be developed to enable the 
algorithm to receive and interpret the various parameter values from a GIS or GPS system in real 
time, generate an optimal allocation of requested resource units to the crisis locations using our 
proposed system and alert the response locations to send the allocated units to the crisis locations. 
A complete automated crisis management system would be realized in this proposed research 
work.
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